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Abstract
We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that
players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of
the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-
farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of match-
ings such that there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from any match-
ing in the set to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there
is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside the set to
some matching in the set (external stability). For the special cases where
all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept pre-
dicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top
choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consist-
ing of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set.
The same result holds when all women are farsighted. We present examples
where this is the unique myopic-farsighted stable set as well as examples of
myopic-farsighted stable sets consisting of a core element di¤erent from the
woman-optimal matching or even of a non-core element.
Key words: Marriage problems, stable sets, myopic and farsighted players.
JEL classication: C70, C78.
Department of Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-mail:
P.Herings@maastrichtuniversity.nl
yCEREC, Saint-Louis University Brussels; CORE, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium. E-mail: ana.mauleon@usaintlouis.be
zCORE, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve; CEREC, Saint-Louis University Brussels,
Belgium. E-mail: vincent.vannetelbosch@uclouvain.be
1 Introduction
Experimental and empirical studies in matching markets suggest that agents are
heterogeneous with respect to their degree of farsightedness and conrm the un-
derlying hypothesis that being unsophisticated is correlated with belonging to a
disadvantaged group.1 Despite this evidence, the extant theoretical literature on
matching markets has only proposed stability concepts assuming that players are
homogeneous regarding their level of myopia or farsightedness.
The current paper proposes a solution concept for marriage problems that al-
lows for the interaction between myopic and farsighted players. This allows us to
study whether farsighted players are able to achieve a better outcome than myopic
players. Our objective is to link the theoretical results regarding the stability of two-
sided matching markets with the experimental and empirical evidence regarding the
question whether markets systematically favor a stable matching with particular
characteristics.
A matching is stable if no individual player prefers to destroy an existing match
and no pair of players prefers to form a match between them. Existing solution con-
cepts for matching markets assume players to have the same degree of farsightedness
and are not able to discriminate between di¤erent stable matchings. For matching
markets populated by heterogeneous players, we demonstrate that farsighted players
are able to achieve their preferred stable matching.
Experimentally, a number of papers analyze decentralized markets. Echenique
and Yariv (2012) nd that subjects are strategically sophisticated and show the im-
pact of the cardinal representation of ordinal preferences on which stable match gets
selected. Kagel and Roth (2000) analyze the transition from decentralized match-
ing to centralized clearinghouses, when market features lead to ine¢ cient matching
through unraveling. Nalbantian and Schotter (1995) analyze several procedures for
matching with transferable utilities, decentralized matching among them, where
1Basteck and Mantovani (2016) test subjectscognitive ability and compare their allocation to
schools under the Boston and the Deferred Acceptance mechanisms. They show subjects of lower
cognitive ability are systematically harmed under Boston and that substantial ability segregation
may result, with the top school enrolling up to 45 percent more high ability students than the worst
school. These results conrm the underlying hypothesis that being unsophisticated is correlated
with belonging to an already disadvantaged group, so that the Boston mechanism would selectively
discriminate the weakest students.
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agents have private information about payo¤s. Boudreau (2011) runs simulation
experiments and shows that there are cases in which one side of the market has
an inherent advantage over the other side in that their more-favored equilibrium is
more likely to prevail when matching evolves in a decentralized manner.2
Following the cooperative game theory model of matching markets,3 the set of
stable matchings coincides with the core in marriage problems. Gale and Shapley
(1962) have shown that the core of a marriage problem is non-empty. Ehlers (2007)
has characterized the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in marriage
problems and has shown that the set of matchings in the core is a subset of any
vNM stable set and a vNM stable set can contain matchings outside the core. Wako
(2010) shows that the vNM stable set exists and is unique.
The standard dominance relation used to dene vNM stable sets violates the
assumption of coalitional sovereignty (C),4 the property that an objecting coalition
cannot enforce matches between members outside the coalition. A further criticism
of the standard denition of the vNM stable set is that it does not take into account
that a deviation by a coalition can be followed by further deviations. Herings,
Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) follow the approach by van Deemen (1991) and
Page and Wooders (2009) and dene the stable set with respect to path dominance
(P), resulting in the pairwise CP vNM set. They show that in marriage problems
there is a unique pairwise CP vNM set and that it coincides with the core.
The notions of core and vNM stable set are myopic notions since the players do
not anticipate that individual and coalitional deviations are countered by subsequent
deviations. These concepts are based on the direct dominance relation and neglect
the destabilizing e¤ect of indirect dominance relations as introduced by Harsanyi
(1974) and Chwe (1994). Indirect dominance captures the idea that coalitions of
farsighted players can anticipate the actions of other coalitions and consider the end
matching that their deviations may lead to.
2There is a growing experimental literature studying centralized matching systems, e.g., Har-
rison and McCabe (1996), Chen and Sönmez (2006), Haruvy and Ünver (2007), Pais and Pintér
(2008), Featherstone and Mayefsky (2011), Featherstone and Niederle (2011), and Echenique, Wil-
son and Yariv (2016).
3We refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive overview on two-sided matching
problems.
4Ray and Vohra (2015) express the same criticism towards the vNM stable set for non-
transferable utility games.
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Based on the concept of indirect dominance, several solution concepts assume
farsighted behavior of the players in matching models. Diamantoudi and Xue (2003)
have shown that in hedonic games with strict preferences core partitions are always
contained in the largest consistent set due to Chwe (1994).5 However, the largest
consistent set may contain more matchings than those matchings that are in the
core. Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) characterize the vNM farsight-
edly stable sets as all singletons that contain a core element and show that the
farsighted core, dened by Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) as the set of matchings
that are not indirectly dominated by other matchings, can be empty.6
The extant theoretical literature is silent about the selection of stable matchings
in case many such matchings exist. We argue here that one possible reason for this
fact is the absence of a solution concept that allows for heterogeneity in the degree
of myopia or farsightedness among players.
In the present paper, we propose the notion of myopic-farsighted stable set to
study the matchings that are stable when myopic and farsighted players interact
with each other. The new notion of myopic-farsighted stable set is based on the
notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted improving path
is a sequence of matchings that can emerge when farsighted players form or destroy
links based on the improvement the end matching o¤ers relative to the current
matching while myopic players form or destroy links based on the improvement
the next matching o¤ers relative to the current matching. Each matching in the
sequence di¤ers from the previous one in that either a new match is formed or an
existing match is destroyed.
A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of matchings satisfying internal and
external stability with respect to the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path.
That is, there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching in the set
to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there is a myopic-farsighted
improving path from any matching outside the set to some matching in the set
(external stability).
When all players are myopic, the myopic-farsighted stable set is equivalent to
5Other approaches to farsightedness in coalition and network formation are suggested by the
work of Xue (1998), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2005),
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004, 2009), and Page and Wooders (2009) among others.
6The farsighted core only exists when the core contains a unique matching and no other matching
indirectly dominates the matching in the core.
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the pairwise CP vNM set of Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) and the
unique myopic-farsighted stable set is equal to the core of the marriage problem.
When all players are farsighted, the myopic-farsighted stable set is closely related
to the vNM farsightedly stable set of Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011).
The myopic-farsighted stable sets with only farsighted players are characterized as
the singletons consisting of a core element.
We then turn to cases where the two sides of the market are heterogeneous
in their degree of farsightedness. We fully analyze the typical example where the
preferences of men and women are diametrically opposed and show that in case all
players on one side are myopic and at least one player on the other side is farsighted,
the optimal stable matching of the farsighted side constitutes the unique myopic-
farsighted stable set. In all other cases, any core outcome and no other outcome is
sustained by the myopic-farsighted stable set.
We assume next that the men are all myopic and the top choice of each man is
a farsighted woman or to remain single. We also study the case where all women
are farsighted without further assumptions on preferences.7 We show that under
both sets of assumptions, the woman-optimal stable matching constitutes a myopic-
farsighted stable set. The result implies that the presence of some farsighted women
is enough to guarantee that the woman-optimal stable matching can always be
reached, starting from any other matching, by means of a myopic-farsighted im-
proving path. Thus, also the myopic women benet from the presence of farsighted
women.
Several papers in the matching literature (see for instance Diamantoudi and Xue
(2003), Ehlers (2007), Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011), and Herings,
Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) among others) point towards the core as the
set of reasonable outcomes, but are not able to discriminate between di¤erent core
elements. However, in these papers, no heterogeneity regarding the degree of far-
sightedness of players in the two sides of the market was considered. Both sides are
assumed to be either myopic or farsighted. By assuming that one side of the market
7Using data on user attributes and interactions from an online dating site, Hitsch, Hortaçsu
and Ariely (2010) estimate mate preferences and use the Gale-Shapley algorithm to predict stable
matches. They show that the average di¤erence between the usersrst choice and the rank achieved
by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is larger for men than for women. Hence, women equilibrium
matches are closer to their rst choice, compared with men. We therefore nd it natural to think
of the women as being more farsighted than the men.
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is more farsighted than the other side, we nd that selection among core elements
is possible.
However, we present examples to show that other myopic-farsighted stable sets
can co-exist. We present an example where the man-optimal stable matching is
di¤erent from the woman-optimal stable matching and show that also the set con-
taining the man-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. More
surprisingly, we also provide an example showing that a set consisting of a single el-
ement not belonging to the core can be a myopic-farsighted stable set. This non-core
element consists of a proper subset of the matches that are present in the woman-
optimal stable matching and matches the farsighted women with the same partner
as in the woman-optimal stable matching.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces marriage problems and
standard notions of stability. Section 3 denes the myopic-farsighted stable set and
characterizes the implications of all possible constellations regarding farsightedness
for the case where preferences of men and women are diametrically opposed. Sec-
tion 4 studies societies where either all players are myopic or all players are farsighted
as special cases. Section 5 establishes the main result that the woman-optimal stable
matching is always a myopic-farsighted stable set when all men are myopic and have
a farsighted woman or remaining single as their top choice and Section 6 presents
the same result when all women are farsighted. Section 7 discusses the robustness
of our main results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Marriage Problems
A marriage problem consists of a nite set of players N; partitioned into a set of
men M and a set of women W . The set of non-empty subsets of N is denoted by
N . Each player i 2 N has a complete and transitive preference ordering i over the
players of opposite sex and the prospect of being alone. Preferences are assumed to
be strict. Let = ((m)m2M ; (w)w2W ) be a preference prole. We write m w m0
if woman w strictly prefers m to m0, m w m0 if w is indi¤erent between m and m0,
and m w m0 if m w m0 or m w m0. Since preferences are assumed to be strict,
m w m0 implies m = m0: Similarly, we write w m w0, w m w0, and w m w0. A
marriage problem is a triple (M;W;).
A matching is a function  : N ! N satisfying the following properties:
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(i) For every m 2M , (m) 2 W [ fmg.
(ii) For every w 2 W , (w) 2M [ fwg.
(iii) For every i 2 N , ((i)) = i.
The set of all matchings is denoted byM. Given a matching  2 M, player i
is said to be single if (i) = i. A matching  is individually rational if each player
is acceptable to his or her partner, so for every i 2 N it holds that (i) i i: A
matching  that is not individually rational can be blocked by a player with an
unacceptable partner. For a given matching , a pair fm;wg is said to form a
blocking pair if m and w are not matched to one another but prefer one another to
their partners at , i.e. w m (m) and m w (w). A matching  is stable if it is
not blocked by any single player or any pair of players.
Given a matching  2 M with man m 2 M matched to woman w 2 W; so
(m) = w; the matching 0 that is identical to ; except that the match between
m and w has been destroyed by either m or w; is denoted by    (m;w): Given a
matching  2 M such that m 2 M and w 2 W are not matched to each other,
the matching 0 that is identical to , except that (m;w) are now matched at 0
and their partners at , i.e., (w) and (m), are now singletons at 0, is denoted by
+ (m;w).
For every i 2 N , we extend the preference ordering i over the players potential
partners to the set of matchingsM in the following way. We say that player i prefers
the matching 0 to the matching  if 0(i) i (i) and we write 0 i . For S 2 N ,
(S) = f(i) j i 2 Sg denotes the set of partners of players in S at . A coalition
S 2 N is said to block a matching  2 M if there exists a matching 0 2 M such
that 0(S) = S and 0 S , where 0 S  is dened as 0(i) i (i) for every
i 2 S. The core of the marriage problem (M;W;) consists of all matchings that
are not blocked by any coalition. We denote the set of matchings that belong to the
core by C.
It has been shown by Gale and Shapley (1962) that the core of a marriage problem
is non-empty. Also, a matching is stable if and only if it is not blocked by a coalition
of size one or two if and only if it belongs to the core, see Theorem 3.3 in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990). Knuth (1976) has shown that the core of a marriage problem is
a distributive lattice. In particular, there is a man-optimal stable matching M and
a woman-optimal stable matching W: For any matching  in the core, for every
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m 2M , it holds that M m : Similarly, for any matching  in the core, for every
w 2 W , it holds that W w :
3 The Myopic-Farsighted Stable Set
The literature on network and coalition formation can be divided into two streams,
depending on whether the approach taken is myopic or farsighted. While the notions
of the core and the vNM stable set assume myopic players in the sense that indi-
vidual and coalitional deviations are not anticipated to be countered by subsequent
deviations, the notions of farsighted core and of vNM farsightedly stable set assume
farsighted players that take the moves of other coalitions into account and consider
the end outcome that their deviations may lead to.8
For marriage problems, a vNM stable set contains the core according to Ehlers
(2007). It exists and is unique due to results by Wako (2010). Herings, Mauleon,
and Vannetelbosch (2017) argue that the standard formulation of the vNM stable
set violates coalitional sovereignty and propose to replace dominance by path dom-
inance. The resulting concept is called the CP vNM set and is shown to coincide
with the core. Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) characterize the vNM
farsightedly stable sets as the singleton core elements.
Up to now, no solution concept has been proposed in order to allow for hetero-
geneity in the degree of farsightedness among players. In the following, we propose
the notion of myopic-farsighted stable set to study the matchings that are stable
when players can be both myopic and farsighted.
Let F  N denote the set of farsighted players. The set F is allowed to be
empty. A myopic-farsighted improving path is a sequence of matchings that can
emerge when farsighted players form or destroy links based on the improvement the
end matching o¤ers them relative to the current matching while myopic players form
or destroy links based on the improvement the next matching in the sequence o¤ers
them relative to the current one.
Denition 1. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players F:
A myopic-farsighted improving path from a matching  2M to a matching 0 2M
8See Chwe (1994), Xue (1998), Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2004), Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2005), Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004, 2009),
and Page and Wooders (2009) among others.
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is a nite sequence of distinct matchings 0; : : : ; L with 0 =  and L = 
0 such
that for every ` 2 f0; : : : ; L  1g either (i) or (ii) holds:
(i) `+1 = `   (m;w) for some (m;w) 2M W such that(
`+1(m) m `(m) if m 2M n F;
L(m) m `(m) if m 2 F;
or (
`+1(w) w `(w) if w 2 W n F;
L(w) w `(w) if w 2 F:
(ii) `+1 = ` + (m;w) for some (m;w) 2M W such that(
`+1(m) m `(m) if m 2M n F;
L(m) m `(m) if m 2 F;
and (
`+1(w) w `(w) if w 2 W n F;
L(w) w `(w) if w 2 F;
with at least one of these preferences being strict.
Each matching in the sequence di¤ers from the previous one in that either an
existing match in the previous matching is destroyed like in case (i) or a new match
is formed between a man and a woman that are not matched to one another in the
previous matching as in case (ii).
If there exists a myopic-farsighted improving path from a matching  to a match-
ing 0, then we write  ! 0. The set of all matchings that can be reached from a
matching  2M by a myopic-farsighted improving path is denoted by h(), so
h() = f0 2M j ! 0g:
Example 1. Consider the marriage problem (M;W;), which corresponds to Ex-
ample 2.31 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) with the roles of men and women reversed.
It holds that M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1; w2; w3g. Assume F = fw1; w3g; so
women w1 and w3 are farsighted and all men and woman w2 are myopic. The
8
preferences of the players are as follows.
m1 m2 m3
w1 w3 w1
w2 w1 w2
w3 w2 w3
w1 w2 w3
m2 m1 m1
m1 m2 m2
m3 m3 m3.
By applying the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), it can
be easily veried that the woman-optimal stable matching is equal to
W(m1) = w1,
W(m2) = w3,
W(m3) = w2.
The matching  dened by
(m1) = w3,
(m2) = w1,
(m3) = w2,
is strictly preferred by w1 and w3 to W and does not make a di¤erence for w2.
However, the pair (m1; w2) can block , so  does not belong to the core.
It holds that  2 h(W), so it is possible that farsighted women leave the woman-
optimal stable matching by means of a myopic-farsighted improving path. To see
this, consider the myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; 4 with 0 = 
W and
4 = , where 1 = 0   (m1; w1), 2 = 1   (m2; w3), 3 = 2 + (m2; w1), and
4 = 3+(m1; w3). This myopic-farsighted improving path is illustrated in Figure 1.
The move to 1 is initiated by w1 who is farsighted and therefore wants to sever
her link with m1 in the anticipation of ending up in a match with m2. Similarly, the
move from 1 to 2 is initiated by w3 who is farsighted and is willing to cut her link
with m2 in the expectation of being matched with m1. The transition to 4 = 
is completed by the subsequent marriages of the single players m2 and w1 and the
single players m1 and w3.
More surprising perhaps is that also W 2 h(). So even though two of the three
women are farsighted, it is possible that they move from  to a matching that none
of them strictly prefers and that is strictly worse for women w1 and w3. To verify this
statement, consider the myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; 4 with 0 = 
9
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Figure 1: Myopic-farsighted improving path in Example 1 to move from W to :
and 4 = 
W, where 1 = 0 + (m1; w2), 2 = 1 + (m2; w3), 3 = 2 + (m1; w1),
and 4 = 3 + (m3; w2). This myopic-farsighted improving path is illustrated in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Myopic-farsighted improving path in Example 1 to move from  to W:
Since m1 is myopic and w2 is myopic, it is possible to establish a link between
them as manm1 strictly prefers w2 = 1(m1) to w3 = 0(m1) and woman w2 strictly
prefers m1 = 1(w2) to m3 = 0(w2). Since at 1 woman w3 has become single, she
is willing to form a link with m2, her partner in the end matching of the sequence,
moving from 1 to 2. Since at 2 woman w1 is single, she is willing to team up
with m1, her partner in the end matching of the sequence, leading to the matching
3. Woman w2 has become single at 3 and marries m3 in order to move to the end
matching 4. The men are myopically improving in each step of the sequence.
Assume now F = fw1; w2; w3g; so all women are farsighted whereas all men
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are myopic. It can be veried that the myopic-farsighted improving paths that were
used to show that W !  and ! W are still valid, though the reasoning changes
occasionally when it involves a move by woman w2 who is now farsighted.
The myopic-farsighted stable set results when we replace the conditions of inter-
nal and external stability in the vNM stable set as based on direct dominance by
the conditions as based on the myopic-farsighted improving paths.
Denition 2. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players
F: A set of matchings V M is a myopic-farsighted stable set if it satises:
(i) Internal stability: For every ; 0 2 V , it holds that 0 62 h().
(ii) External stability: For every  2M n V , it holds that h() \ V 6= ;.
Condition (i) of Denition 2 corresponds to internal stability. For any two match-
ings  and 0 in the myopic-farsighted stable set V it does not hold that  ! 0.
Condition (ii) of Denition 2 expresses external stability. For every matching 
outside the myopic-farsighted stable set V it holds that there is 0 2 V such that
! 0.
In Example 2, we consider the most basic situation of conict between the ob-
jectives of men and women, where the most preferred woman of each man ranks him
as the worst possible marriage partner.
Example 2. Consider the marriage problem (M;W;) with two men,M = fm1;m2g,
and two women, W = fw1; w2g. Assume F = W; so the women are farsighted and
the men are myopic. The preferences of men and women are diametrically opposed
to each other:
m1 m2
w1 w2
w2 w1
w1 w2
m2 m1
m1 m2:
There are seven possible matchings, illustrated in Figure 3. The man-optimal stable
matching is equal to 6 and the woman-optimal stable matching to 7: Table 1
presents the matchings that can be reached from a given initial matching by means of
a myopic-farsighted improving path. Notice that W 2 h(M) because the farsighted
woman w1 rst leaves m1 to become single at the matching 4: Next, the farsighted
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Figure 3: All possible matchings in Example 2, where 6 = 
M and 7 = 
W:
 h()
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 5 6 7
3 2 5 6 7
4 3 6 7
5 3 4 6 7
6 7
7 3 5
Table 1: The set of matchings that can be reached by a myopic-farsighted improving
path in Example 2 when F = fw1; w2g: It holds that 6 = M and 7 = W:
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woman w2 marries m1 to arrive at the matching 3: Next, w1 marries m2 to reach
W:
We argue that the set V = fWg is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The condition
of internal stability in Denition 2 is satised since the set V is a singleton. Since
for every  2Mn fWg, it holds that 7 2 h(), the condition of external stability
in Denition 2 is satised as well. We have shown that V = fWg is a myopic-
farsighted stable set.
It is not hard to demonstrate that there are no other myopic-farsighted stable
sets. Let V be a myopic-farsighted stable set not equal to fWg. The condition of
internal stability in Denition 2 together with the fact that W 2 h() for every
 2M n fWg implies that
W =2 V:
To satisfy the condition of external stability in Denition 2, it should therefore hold
that
3 2 V or 5 2 V:
Since h(6) = f7g and 7 =2 V; external stability implies that
6 2 V:
Since 6 2 h(3) and 6 2 h(5); we obtain a contradiction with internal stability.
We next analyze the case in which exactly one player is farsighted, say woman
w1: Table 1 remains almost unchanged, except that it is no longer the case that 3
belongs to h(7): The argument that V = f7g is a myopic-farsighted stable set
remains una¤ected. The argument that there is no other myopic-farsighted stable
set proceeds along the same lines as before and becomes slightly easier. The other
three cases with only only farsighted player follow by symmetry.
Example 2 shows that in the most basic situation of conict between the objec-
tives of men and women, farsighted women are able to obtain their most preferred
solution. Moreover, this is the unique prediction as made by the concept of the
myopic-farsighted stable set. In fact, it is not even needed that both women are far-
sighted. Even if only one of them is farsighted, the woman-optimal stable matching
results as the unique prediction.
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Example 3. We take the same primitives as in Example 2, but now vary the
assumptions with respect to farsightedness.
The case where nobody is farsighted leads to a concept that is equivalent to the
pairwise CP vNM set of Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017), see also Sec-
tion 4. It follows from their Theorem 1 that the core is the unique myopic-farsighted
stable set, so V = fM; Wg: The main intuition for this result comes from the con-
tribution by Roth and Vande Vate (1990), who have shown that it is possible to reach
a core element from any initial matching by a sequence of myopic improvements,
and the fact that at a core element myopic improvements are impossible.
We now turn to the case where all players are farsighted, F = M [W: Table 2
presents the matchings that can be reached from a given initial matching by means
of a myopic-farsighted improving path. Since both 6 and 7 can be reached from
 h()
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 5 6 7
3 2 6 7
4 3 6 7
5 4 6 7
6 7
7 6
Table 2: The set of matchings that can be reached by a myopic-farsighted improving
path in Example 3 when F =M [W: It holds that 6 = M and 7 = W:
any other matching, it follows that both f6g and f7g are myopic-farsighted stable
sets. It is easily veried that there are no other myopic-farsighted stable sets. As
in the case of completely myopic players, we obtain all core elements as the unique
prediction, be it that these elements are predicted as singletons in the farsighted
case.
The case where all players are farsighted with the exception of one player, say
F = fm1; w1; w2g; is very close to the situation where everyone is farsighted. Com-
pared to Table 2, the only change is that 3 2 h(5) and 3 2 h(7): This will
not a¤ect the analysis and the conclusion that the woman-optimal stable matching
and the man-optimal stable matching can be both sustained as singleton myopic-
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farsighted stable sets remains.
The nal case is where one player on each side is farsighted, say F = fm1; w1g:
Table 3 presents the matchings that can be reached from a given initial matching by
means of a myopic-farsighted improving path. Since both 6 and 7 can be reached
 h()
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 5 6 7
3 2 6 7
4 2 3 6 7
5 2 3 4 6 7
6 7
7 2 6
Table 3: The set of matchings that can be reached by a myopic-farsighted improving
path in Example 3 when F = fm1; w1g: It holds that 6 = M and 7 = W:
from any other matching, it follows that both f6g and f7g are myopic-farsighted
stable sets. It is easily veried that there are no other myopic-farsighted stable sets.
The predictions are therefore identical to the case where all players are farsighted.
It follows from a symmetry argument that all other cases with exactly one player
on each side being farsighted lead to the same predictions.
Example 3 illustrates that any core element can be sustained in some myopic-
farsighted stable set in case both sides of the markets are similar in terms of their
degree of farsightedness as well as in the case where all players are farsighted except
one.
4 Homogeneous Societies
In this section we consider the case where either all players are myopic or all players
are farsighted.
First consider the case where all players are myopic, so F = ;: Denition 2
then boils down to the pairwise CP vNM set as dened in Herings, Mauleon, and
Vannetelbosch (2017). This set di¤ers from the standard notion of a vNM set in
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three important ways. The standard denition, see Ehlers (2007) and Wako (2010),
violates the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, the property that an objecting
coalition cannot enforce the organization of players outside the coalition. Second,
the standard denition of the vNM set is such that it does not take into account
that a deviation by a coalition can be followed by further deviations. The pairwise
CP vNM set follows the approach by van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders
(2009), which takes into account that if a matching is blocked by some coalition
and the resulting matching is not in the stable set itself, then further deviations
will take place. This observation leads van Deemen (1991) to dene the generalized
stable set for abstract systems and Page and Wooders (2009) to dene the stable set
with respect to path dominance. Third, we restrict ourselves to deviations by single
players and pairs. It follows from the results in Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch
(2017) that identical results are obtained when coalitions of arbitrary size are allowed
to move.
The following result is stated as Theorem 1 in Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetel-
bosch (2017). The proof is based on a result by Roth and Vande Vate (1990),
claiming that, from any matching that does not belong to the core, a core element
can be reached by a nite sequence of myopic improvements.
Theorem 1. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players
F = ;: A set of matchings is a myopic-farsighted stable set if and only if it is equal
to the core.
At the other side of the spectrum, we have the case where all players are far-
sighted, so F =M [W: Denition 2 is then closely related to the vNM farsightedly
stable set as dened in Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011), which in turn
is based on the work by Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994), and Diamantoudi and Xue
(2003). The only di¤erence is that we restrict ourselves to deviations by single play-
ers and pairs. It is not hard to see that any individually rational matching that can
be reached by arbitrary coalitional deviations can also be reached by deviations by
single players and pairs.
The next lemma shows that any matching in a myopic-farsighted stable set in
case F =M [W is individually rational.
Lemma 1. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players F =
M [W: Let V be a myopic-farsighted stable set and  2 V: Then  is individually
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rational.
Proof. Suppose  is not individually rational. Then there is m 2 M and w 2 W
such that (m) = w; and m m w or w w m: Without loss of generality, assume
m m w: It holds that  =2 h(  (m;w)) as the farsighted man m will never accept
a match with w: On the other hand,    (m;w) 2 h(); so by internal stability
of V it holds that    (m;w) =2 V: By external stability of V it holds that there
is 0 2 h(   (m;w)) such that 0 2 V: Let 1; : : : ; L with 1 =    (m;w) and
L = 
0 be a myopic-farsighted improving path from    (m;w) to 0: Since m
is farsighted, it holds that 0(m) m m: Now it follows that 0; 1; : : : ; L with
0 =  is a myopic-farsighted improving path from  to 
0 and therefore 0 2 h():
This contradicts the fact that V is internally stable. Consequently,  is individually
rational.
Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) show that the vNM farsightedly
stable sets are characterized as all singletons that consist of a core element. The
next result conrms that the same characterization applies to the myopic-farsighted
stable set when all players are farsighted.
Theorem 2. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players
F =M [W: A set of matchings is a myopic-farsighted stable set if and only if it is
a singleton consisting of a core element.
Proof. Let V be a myopic-farsighted stable set. By Lemma 1, every matching in V is
individually rational. So even when arbitrary coalitions are allowed to move, the set
V satises internal stability, and obviously also external stability. It is therefore a
vNM farsightedly stable set and Theorem 2 of Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote
(2011) now implies that it is a singleton consisting of a core element.
Let V be a singleton consisting of a core element. Theorem 1 of Mauleon,
Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) states that V is a vNM farsightedly stable set,
so it satises internal and external stability as based on arbitrary coalitional moves.
Since a core element is individually rational, even when only moves by single players
and pairs of players are allowed, V remains to satisfy external stability, and obviously
also internal stability. It follows that V is a myopic-farsighted stable set.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that all core elements can be sustained when all players
are farsighted, but any other matching not.
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5 All Men Are Myopic
Typical results in the matching literature point towards the core as the set of reason-
able outcomes, but are not able to discriminate among di¤erent core elements. Does
the introduction of heterogeneity in terms of farsightedness allow us to discriminate
between di¤erent core elements? A closely related issue is whether farsighted players
are able to enforce their optimal stable matching. For instance, is it always possible
to reach the woman-optimal stable matching W from any matching  6= W by
means of a myopic-farsighted stable path as was the case in Example 2? The answer
is a¢ rmative under certain conditions.
In this section we study the case where the players on one side, the men, are all
myopic, whereas any player on the other side, the women, can be either myopic or
farsighted. For every m 2M , let w(m) 2 W [ fmg denote the top choice of m; so
w(m) m w for every w 2 W and w(m) m m:
Assumption 1. For every m 2M , it holds that w(m) 2 F [ fmg:
Assumption 1 requires the top choice of every man to be a farsighted woman or to
remain single. Intuitively this corresponds to the requirement that the farsighted
side is desirable. It is automatically satised when all women are farsighted.
We prove rst that the woman-optimal stable matching W can be reached from
any matching  with the property that, for every w 2 W , W(w) w (w): Since the
core has a lattice structure and the woman-optimal stable matching W is weakly
preferred by all women to any other core element, Lemma 2 covers all matchings 
that belong to the core.
Lemma 2. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem satisfying Assumption 1 with set
of farsighted players F  W: For every  2M n fWg such that, for every w 2 W ,
W(w) w (w) it holds that W 2 h().
Proof. Let  2 M n fWg be a matching such that, for every w 2 W , W(w) w
(w): We construct a myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; L from 0 =  to
L = 
W. Let
W 1 = fw 2 W n F j W(w) w (w) and (w) 2Mg
be the, possibly empty, set of myopic women w who strictly prefer W(w) to (w)
and who are not single at : Let k1 be the cardinality ofW 1: The set of men married
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at  to a woman w 2 W 1 is denoted by M1 = (W 1): Take an arbitrary order of
the men in M1; say m0; : : : ;mk1 1:
For ` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g; we dene the matching `+1 = ` + (m`; w(m`)), so
the k1 men in the set M1 sequentially marry their top choices. We argue that the
sequence of matchings 0; : : : ; k1 is the rst part of a myopic-farsighted improving
path from  to W by showing that for every ` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g we have
(i) `+1(m`) = w
(m`) m` `(m`);
(ii) L(w
(m`)) = W(w(m`)) w(m`) `(w(m`)):
Let some ` 2 0; : : : ; k1  1 be given. The strict preference in (i) holds because m` is
married to the myopic woman `(m`) 2 W nF , whereas his top choice is a farsighted
woman.
We now show that (ii) holds. If `(w
(m`)) = (w(m`)); then it holds that
W(w(m`)) w(m`) `(w(m`)) by assumption. Otherwise, there is `0 < ` such
that
w(m`0) = w(m`) and `(w
(m`)) = `0(w
(m`0)) = m`0 :
Suppose m`0 w(m`0 ) W(w(m`0)): Then W(m`0) 6= w(m`0); so it follows that
w(m`0) m`0 W(m`0): Now the pair (m`0 ; w(m`0)) can block W; a contradic-
tion. Consequently, it holds that W(w(m`0)) w(m`0 ) m`0 ; which is equivalent to
W(w(m`)) w(m`) `(w(m`)); so (ii) holds.
At k1, every man in M
1 is either single or married to his top choice.
Let
M2 =

m 2M j k1(m) 2 F n fW(m)g
	
be the, possibly empty, set of men that are married at k1 to a farsighted woman
di¤erent from W(m): For every m 2M2 it holds that either m 2M1 and k1(m) =
w(m) 6= W(m); or m 2M nM1 and k1(m) 2 F is such that W(k1(m)) k1 (m)
m; where in the latter case we use that k1(m) = (m): Let k
2 be the cardinality of
the set M2. Take an arbitrary order of the men in M2, say m0; : : : ;mk2 1:
For ` 2 f0; : : : ; k2 1g; we dene the matching k1+`+1 = k1+` (m`; k1+`(m`)),
so the k2 farsighted women married to the men in M2 sequentially destroy their
matches under k1 and all men in M
2 become single.
We argue that the sequence of matchings k1 ; : : : ; k1+k2 is the second part of
a myopic-farsighted improving path from  to W by showing that, for every ` 2
f0; : : : ; k2   1g; W(k1+`(m`)) k1+`(m`) m`:
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Let some ` 2 f0; : : : ; k2 1g be given. Ifm` 2M nM1; then the assertion above is
obviously true, so consider the case m 2M1: Suppose m` k1+`(m`) W(k1+`(m`)):
Since k1+`(m`) = w
(m`) 6= W(m`) by construction of M2; we have m` w(m`)
W(w(m`)) and w(m`) m` W(m`); so the pair (m`; w(m`)) blocks W; a con-
tradiction. Consequently, it holds that W(k1+`(m`)) k1+`(m`) m`:
At k1+k2, every man m 2 M1 is single or matched to W(m): Also, every man
m 2M nM1 is single or matched to W(m):
Let
M3 =

m 2M j k1+k2(m) = m and W(m) 2 W
	
be the, possibly empty, set of men that are single at k1+k2 and married at 
W: Let
W 3 =

w 2 W j k1+k2(w) = w and W(w) 2M
	
be the, possibly empty, set of women that are single at k1+k2 and married at 
W.
Let k3 = jM3j = jW 3j be the cardinality of these sets. Take an arbitrary order of
the men in M3; say m0; : : : ;mk3 1:
For ` 2 f0; : : : ; k3   1g; we dene k1+k2+`+1 = k1+k2+` + (m`; W(m`)); so the
men in M3 sequentially marry the women in W 3 to whom they are matched under
W until we arrive at k1+k2+k3 = 
W: It holds that
k1+k2+`+1(m`) = 
W(m`) m` m` = k1+k2+`(m`);
k1+k2+`+1(w`) = 
W(w`) w` w` = k1+k2+`(w`); if w` 2 W n F;
k1+k2+k3(w`) = 
W(w`) w` w` = k1+k2+`(w`); if w` 2 F;
so the conditions in Denition 1 are satised.
We prove Lemma 2 using the fact that any woman w 2 W either strictly prefers
W to  2 M n fWg or is indi¤erent between  and W. We rst identify the
set W 1 of myopic women that strictly prefer W to  and that are not single at
, together with the set M1 of men married at  to a woman in W 1: In order to
reach W departing from , we rst allow each man in M1 to marry his top choice
and we show that the top choice weakly prefers the end matching W to the current
matching. Next, we let each farsighted woman that is matched to a man di¤erent
from the one at W destroy her match and become single and we show that each of
these farsighted women strictly prefer the end matching W to the current matching.
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Finally, we let all single men that are married at W form the corresponding match.
Thus, we have constructed a myopic-farsighted improving path from  to W:
The next lemma is known as the blocking lemma and is due to J.S. Hwang. It is
presented as Lemma 3.5 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). For an arbitrary matching
 2M, we dene the set of women that strictly prefer  to W by W (), so
W () = fw 2 W j (w) w W(w)g.
It follows from the lattice structure of the core that if  2 C; then we haveW () = ;:
Lemma 3. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem and let  2M be an individually
rational matching. If W () is non-empty, then there is a pair (m;w) 2 (W ())
(W nW ()) that blocks .
Lemma 3 states that if the set of women that strictly prefer the individually
rational matching  to W is non-empty, then there is a blocking pair (m;w) such
that m is married to a woman strictly preferring  and w is weakly preferring W:
Lemma 3 is crucial for the proof of Lemma 4, which complements the case studied
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem satisfying Assumption 1 with set
of farsighted players F  W: For every  2 M such that W () 6= ; it holds that
W 2 h():
Proof. We construct a myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; L from 0 =  to
L = 
W. Let
W 1 = fw 2 (M) j (w) (w) w or w w (w)g
be the, possibly empty, set of women that are involved in a match that is not indi-
vidually rational for at least one of the partners involved and denote the cardinality
of W 1 by k1: Take an arbitrary order of the women in W 1; say w0; : : : ; wk1 1: For
` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g; we dene the matching `+1 = `   ((w`); w`), so the player
who is involved in a match under  that is not individually rational destroys his or
her link.
Consider the set W (k1) of women that strictly prefer k1(w) to 
W(w). The
set W (k1) is empty if and only if all women in W () were matched at  to a man
that preferred to be single. For ` 2 fk1; k1 + 1; : : :g; whenever W (`) 6= ;, select
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some (m`; w`) 2 `(W (`))  (W nW (`)) that blocks `. Such a pair (m`; w`) is
guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3. We dene the matching `+1 = ` + (m`; w`).
We argue next that after a nite number of steps, say k2, the setW (k1+k2) = ;.
Since for every `  k1, the man involved in the block is married, it follows that
the cardinality of the set `(W (`)) of men married to women in W (`) is weakly
decreasing in ` and that these sets are nested in one another. The only possibility
for the cardinality of this set to remain the same is that woman w` is single under
`. In that case, it holds that `+1(m`) = w` m` `(m`) and, for every m 2
`(W (`)) n fm`g, `+1(m) = `(m). Man m` is strictly improving and all other
men in `(W (`)) remain married to the same partner. It follows that cycling is
impossible, so after a nite number of steps k2 we have W (k1+k2) = ;.
Since W (k1+k2) = ;; the matching k1+k2 is either equal to W or satises the
assumptions of Lemma 2. In the former case we are done, in the latter case we
proceed as in the proof of Lemma 2 to complete the construction of the myopic-
farsighted improving path leading to W. It remains to be veried that for every
` 2 f0; : : : ; k1 + k2   1g the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Consider some ` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g and let (m`; w`) be such that `+1 = `  
(m`; w`). It holds that m` m` `(m`) or w` w` `(w`). In the former case, we
have that
`+1(m`) = m` m` `(m`);
and in the latter case that
`+1(w`) = w` w` `(w`); if w` 2 W n F;
L(wL) = 
W(w`) w` w` w` `(w`); if w` 2 F ,
so the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Consider some ` 2 fk1; : : : ; k1+ k2  1g. Since (m`; w`) blocks `, it follows that
`+1(m`) m` `(m`) and `+1(w`) w` `(w`):
It holds that w` 2 W nW (`), so
W(w`) w` `(w`):
Irrespective of whether w` is farsighted or myopic, the conditions of Denition 1 are
therefore satised.
22
In the proof of Lemma 4, in order to reach W departing from , rst the matches
that are not individually rational at  are destroyed until we arrive at an individually
rational matching k1 : Starting from k1, we generate a sequence of blocking pairs
(m`; w`) with `  k1 such that the pair (m`; w`) blocks `: The blocking pair (m`; w`)
is chosen such that m` is matched at ` to a woman in W (`); so a woman that
strictly prefers ` to 
W; and w` does not belong to W (`): Lemma 3 guarantees
that such a blocking pair exists. We show that after a nite number of steps, we
arrive at a matching k1+k2 such that no woman strictly prefers k1+k2 to 
W; i.e.,
W (k1+k2) = ;: Thus, the matching k1+k2 either coincides with W or satises the
assumptions of Lemma 2. In the latter case, we complete the myopic-farsighted
improving path leading to W as in the proof of Lemma 2.
From Lemmas 2 and 4, it follows easily that fWg is a myopic-farsighted stable
set.
Theorem 3. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem satisfying Assumption 1 with set
of farsighted players F  W: Then fWg is a myopic-farsighted stable set.
Proof. Since fWg is a singleton set, Condition (i) of Denition 2, internal stability,
is satised. Condition (ii) of Denition 2, external stability, follows from Lemmas 2
and 4.
If the farsighted side of the market is desirable, then that side is able to induce
its optimal stable matching, since fWg is a myopic-farsighted stable set. In order
to obtain this result we have proved that, starting from any matching, we can
always reach the woman-optimal stable matching by means of a myopic-farsighted
improving path. The fact that we can reach a designated core element is striking,
certainly when taking into account that the celebrated result of Roth and Vande
Vate (1990) only shows that some core element can always be reached by means of
a myopic improving path from any initial matching.
Several results in the matching literature, see for instance Diamantoudi and Xue
(2003), Ehlers (2007), Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011), and Herings,
Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) among others, point towards the core as the
set of reasonable outcomes, but are not able to discriminate between di¤erent core
elements. However, in these papers, no heterogeneity regarding the degree of far-
sightedness of players on the two sides of the market was taken into account and
it was assumed that both sides were either myopic or farsighted. In case one side
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of the market is myopic whereas the other side contains some farsighted players,
Example 2 illustrates that the optimal stable matching for the farsighted side may
be the only myopic-farsighted stable set, whereas Theorem 3 provides a condition
under which the most farsighted side can always reach its optimal stable matching.
6 All Women Are Farsighted
In Section 5 we have considered the case where all men are myopic, whereas any given
woman can be either myopic or farsighted. In this section we assume all women to
be farsighted, whereas any given man can be either myopic or farsighted. We prove
rst that the woman-optimal stable matching W can be reached from any matching
 di¤erent from W with the property that, for every w 2 W; W(w) w (w): This
covers the case where  is a core element di¤erent from W:
Lemma 5. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players F 
W: For every  2 M n fWg such that, for every w 2 W , W(w) w (w) it holds
that W 2 h().
Proof. Let  2 M n fWg be a matching such that, for every w 2 W; W(w) w
(w): We construct a myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; L from 0 =  to
L = 
W: Let
W 1 = fw 2 W j W(w) w (w) and (w) 2Mg
be the, possibly empty, set of women who strictly prefer W(w) to (w) and who
are married at : Let k1 be the cardinality of W 1: Take an arbitrary order of the
women in W 1; say w0; : : : ; wk1 1:
For ` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g; we dene the matching `+1 = `   (`(w`); w`); so the
k1 women in W 1 sequentially destroy their matches. We show that the sequence of
matchings 0; : : : ; k1 is the rst part of a myopic-farsighted improving path from 
to W by showing that for every ` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g we have L(w`) = W(w`) w`
`(w`): This follows since `(w`) = (w`) and by the denition of W
1:
At k1 every woman is either single or married to her partner at 
W: It then
follows that at k1 every man is either single or married to his partner at 
W: Let
W 2 = fw 2 W j W(w) w k1(w)g
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be the set of women that strictly prefer the match at W to being single. Let k2
be the cardinality of the set W 2: Take an arbitrary order of the women in W 2; say
w0; : : : ; wk2 1: For ` = 0; : : : ; k2   1; we dene m` = W(w`):
For ` = 0; : : : ; k2   1; we dene the matching k1+`+1 = k1+` + (m`; w`); so
the k2 women in W 2 sequentially marry their partner at W: It holds that L =
k1+k2 = 
W: Observe that the sequence of matchings k1 ; : : : ; k1+k2 is the nal
part of a myopic-farsighted improving path from  to W since it holds that, for
every ` 2 f0; : : : ; k2   1g;
k1+`+1(m`) = 
W(m`) m` m` = k1+`(m`); if m` 2M n F;
L(m`) = 
W(m`) m` m` = k1+`(m`); if m` 2 F;
L(w`) = 
W(w`) w` w` = k1+`(w`):
As in the proof of Lemma 2, the proof of Lemma 5 rst identies the set W 1 of
women that strictly prefer W to  and that are not single at : Since all women
in W 1 are farsighted, they are willing to divorce their men. The resulting matching
is such that all women are either married to their partner at W or are single. The
latter women now marry their partner at W:
We now turn to the case where the matching  is such that some women prefer
 to W; so the set of women W () that strictly prefer their match at  to the one
at W is not empty.
Lemma 6. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players F 
W: For every  2M such that W () 6= ; it holds that W 2 h():
Proof. We construct a myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; L from 0 =  to
L = 
W: Let
W 1 = fw 2 (M) j (w) (w) w or w w (w)g
be the, possibly empty, set of women that are involved in a match that is not
individually rational for at least one of the partners and denote the cardinality of
W 1 by k1: Take an arbitrary order of the women in W 1; say w0; : : : ; wk1 1: For
` 2 f0; : : : ; k1   1g; we dene m` = (w`) to be the man married to w` at  and we
dene the matching `+1 = `   (m`; w`), so the player who is involved in a match
under  that is not individually rational destroys his or her link. We argue that the
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sequence of matchings 0; : : : ; k1 is the rst part of a myopic-farsighted improving
path from  to W:
Let some ` 2 f0; : : : ; k1  1g be given. It holds that m` m` w` or w` w` m`: In
the former case, we have that
`+1(m`) = m` m` `(m`); if m` 2M n F;
L(w`) = 
W(m`) m` m` m` `(m`); if m` 2 F;
whereas in the latter case it holds that
L(w`) = 
W(w`) w` w` w` `(w`);
so the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Let
W 2 = fw 2 W (k1) j k1(w) 2 Fg
be the, possibly empty, set of women that prefer their match at k1 to the one
at W and that are matched to a farsighted man. We denote the cardinality of
W 2 by k2 and take an arbitrary order of the women in W 2; say w0; : : : ; wk2 1: For
` 2 f0; : : : ; k2  1g; we dene m` = k1(w`) to be the man married to w` at k1 and
we dene the matching k1+`+1 = k1+`   (m`; w`); so man m` destroys his match
with w`:We argue that the sequence of matchings k1 ; : : : ; k1+k2 is the second part
of a myopic-farsighted improving path from  to W:
Let some ` 2 f0; : : : ; k2   1g be given. Since m` w` W(w`) and W is a core
element, it holds that
L(m`) = 
W(m`) m` w` = k1+`(m`);
so the conditions of Denition 1 are satised.
Consider the set W (k1+k2) of women that strictly prefer k1+k2(w) to 
W(w).
By construction of k1+k2 it holds that the set k1+k2(W (k1+k2)) of men married to a
woman in W (k1+k2) are all myopic. For ` 2 f0; 1; : : :g; whenever W (k1+k2+`) 6= ;;
select some
(m`; w`) 2 (k1+k2+`(W (k1+k2+`))) (W nW (k1+k2+`))
that blocks k1+k2+`: Such a pair (m`; w`) is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3. We
dene the matching k1+k2+`+1 = k1+k2+` + (m`; w`).
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We argue next that after a nite number of steps, say k3, W (k1+k2+k3) = ;.
Since for every `  0, the man involved in the block is married to a woman
in W (k1+k2+`); it follows that the cardinality of the set k1+k2+`(W (k1+k2+`)) is
weakly decreasing in ` and that these sets are nested in one another. The only pos-
sibility for the cardinality of this set to remain the same is that woman w` is single
under k1+k2+`. In that case, it holds that k1+k2+`+1(m`) = w` m` k1+k2+`(m`)
and, for every m 2 k1+k2+`(W (k1+k2+`)) n fm`g; k1+k2+`+1(m) = k1+k2+`(m).
Man m` is strictly improving and all other men in k1+k2+`(W (k1+k2+`)) remain
married to the same partner. It follows that cycling is impossible, so after a nite
number of steps k3 we have W (k1+k2+k3) = ;.
We argue that the sequence of matchings k1+k2 ; : : : ; k1+k2+k3 is the third part
of a myopic-farsighted improving path from  to W:
Let some ` 2 f0; : : : ; k3 1g be given. Since the set of men k1+k2+`(W (k1+k2+`))
is a subset of k1+k2(W (k1+k2)); it holds that m` is myopic. Since (m`; w`) blocks
k1+k2+`; it follows that
k1+k2+`+1(m`) m` k1+k2+`(m`):
It holds that w` 2 W nW (k1+k2+`); so
L(w`) = 
W(w`) w` `(w`):
The conditions of Denition 1 are therefore satised.
SinceW (k1+k2+k3) = ;; the matching k1+k2+k3 is either equal to W or satises
the assumptions of Lemma 5. In the former case we are done, in the latter case we
proceed as in the proof of Lemma 5 to complete the construction of the myopic-
farsighted improving path leading to W:
The proof of Lemma 6 proceeds as follows. As in the proof of Lemma 4, in order
to reach W departing from , rst the matches that are not individually rational
at  are destroyed until we arrive at an individually rational matching k1 :We then
identify all the women that prefer k1 to 
W and are married to a farsighted man.
Since W is a core element, it follows that such a farsighted man prefers W to
k1 and is willing to destroy the match with his partner. In this way we obtain
a matching k1+k2 such that all women that prefer k1+k2 to 
W are married to a
myopic man. From here, we proceed essentially in the same way as in Lemma 4.
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From Lemmas 5 and 6, it follows easily that fWg is a myopic-farsighted stable
set.
Theorem 4. Let (M;W;) be a marriage problem with set of farsighted players
F  W: Then fWg is a myopic-farsighted stable set.
Proof. Since fWg is a singleton set, Condition (i) of Denition 2, internal stability,
is satised. Condition (ii) of Denition 2, external stability, follows from Lemmas 5
and 6.
We have shown that in case all women are farsighted, they can achieve the
woman-optimal stable matching, irrespective of the farsightedness of the men.
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss the robustness of our main result by answering some
open questions. Is fWg the only myopic-farsighted stable set under the conditions
of Theorems 3 and 4? The answer to this question is negative, as illustrated by
Example 4. In Example 4, we assume that the farsighted players coincide with the
women, F = W; thereby satisfying the conditions of both Theorems 3 and 4. This
example illustrates that fMg can be a myopic-farsighted stable set as well, which
implies that it is possible to reach the man-optimal stable matching M from W:
Example 4. Consider the marriage problem (M;W;), where M = fm1;m2;m3g
and W = fw1; w2; w3g and the preferences of the players are as follows:
m1 m2 m3
w1 w3 w1
w2 w1 w2
w3 w2 w3:
w1 w2 w3
m1 m2 m3
m2 m3 m2
m3 m1 m1
We assume F = W; so all women are farsighted and all men are myopic. It is
easily veried that this example satises the conditions of both Theorems 3 and
4. Using the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) with men
proposing and with women proposing, it is immediate that the man-optimal and
woman-optimal stable matchings are given by
M(m1) = w1,
M(m2) = w3,
M(m3) = w2.
W(m1) = w1,
W(m2) = w2,
W(m3) = w3,
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We rst argue that M 2 h(W). To verify this assertion, consider the myopic-
farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; 4 with 0 = 
W and 4 = 
M, where 1 =
0 + (m2; w1), 2 = 1 + (m3; w2), 3 = 2 + (m2; w3), and 4 = 3 + (m1; w1): For
an illustration, see Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Myopic-farsighted improving path in Example 4 to move from W to M:
Since m2 strictly prefers 1(m2) = w1 to 0(m2) = w2 and the farsighted woman
w1 is indi¤erent between 4 and 0; the addition of link (m2; w1) to 0 satises
Condition (ii) of Denition 1. Since now at 1 woman w2 has become unmatched,
she is willing to form a link withm3; her partner in the end matching of the sequence,
moving from 1 to 2. Since 2(m3) = w2 m2 w3 = 1(m3); this is also a myopic
improvement form3: Since now at 2 women w3 is unmatched, she is willing to team
up withm2; her partner in the end matching of the sequence, leading to the matching
3. Since 3(m2) = w3 m2 w1 = 2(m2); this is also a myopic improvement for m2:
Man m1 and woman w1 are both single at 3 and are both happy to marry, which
moves them to the end matching 4 = 
M.
Consider next any matching  2 M n fM; Wg: We argue that M 2 h()
by constructing a myopic-farsighted improving path 0; : : : ; L with 0 =  and
L = 
M:
Assume rst that (m1) 6= w1: We dene 1 = 0 + (m1; w1). Since w1 is the
best partner for m1; this is clearly a myopic improvement for m1: Since m1 is the
best partner for w1 and L(w1) = 
M(w1) = m1; this is a farsighted improvement
for w1:
If 1 = 
M; then we have shown that M 2 h():
If 1 = 
W, then following the myopic-farsighted improving path from W to M
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constructed at the beginning of the example, we also have M 2 h().
If 1 2 M n fM; Wg; then w2 or w3 is single under 1: If w2 is single, then
let her marry m3 and move to 2 = 1 + (m3; w2): Since at 1 man m3 is not
married to w1; this is a myopic improvement for m3: It is also clearly a farsighted
improvement for w2: If w2 is not single, but w3 is, then let her marry m2 and
move to 2 = 1 + (m2; w3): Since w3 is the preferred partner of m2; this is clearly
a myopic improvement for m2: It is also clearly a farsighted improvement for w3:
Either 2 = 
M and we are done, or 2 consists of two matched pairs (m1; w1) and
(m3; w2); both being part of M; and two single players, m2 and w3: In this case,
we form the missing pair (m2; w3) from M and move from 2 to 3 = 
M. This
completes the construction of the myopic-farsighted improving path to M for the
case (m1) 6= w1:
Assume next that (m1) = w1:We can then proceed with the myopic-farsighted
improving path starting from 1 as constructed in the previous paragraph, with 1
being replaced by :
The singleton set V = fMg trivially satises Condition (i), internal stability,
of Denition 2. Since we have shown that M 2 h() for every  6= M; it also
satises Condition (ii) of Denition 2, external stability. It follows that V = fMg
is a myopic-farsighted stable set.
Example 4 shows that even though fWg is the focal myopic-farsighted stable
set, in some examples there are other myopic-farsighted stable sets as well.
Example 5 has the same primitives as Example 4 and demonstrates that in some
cases even a non-core element can serve as a myopic-farsighted stable set.
Example 5. Let (M;W;) with F = W be the marriage problem of Example 4.
Consider now the matching 0 illustrated in Figure 5 with
0(m1) = w1,
0(m2) = m2,
0(m3) = w3,
that contains only two of the matches of the woman-optimal stable matching W.
The matching 0 is not stable as (m2; w2) blocks 0:
We show next that V = f0g satises external stability and is therefore a single-
ton myopic-farsighted stable set.
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m3 w3
m2 w2
m1 w1
0
Figure 5: The matching 0 of Example 5.
Take any  6= 0 and take 0 = : We construct a myopic-farsighted improving
path 0; : : : L with L = 
0: If w2 is married under ; then add the match ((w2); w1)
to 0 and move to 1 = 0 + ((w2); w1). Notice that marrying w1 is a myopic
improvement for (w2) since w1 is strictly preferred to w2 by any man. Since m1
is the best possible partner for woman w1; she weakly prefers the end matching 0
with 0(w1) = m1 to 0(w1) and is therefore willing to collaborate.
It holds that w2 is not married under  or has become single after the marriage
of (w2) and w1: We therefore obtain a matching ` such that `(w2) = w2; where
` is either equal to 0 or 1: If `(w1) 6= m1; then move to `+1 = `+ (m1; w1): Since
w1 is the best possible partner for m1; this is a myopic improvement for m1: In case
`(w1) 6= m1 it holds that 0(w1) = m1 w1 `(w1); so the marriage with m1 is a
farsighted improvement for w1:
We now have a matching such that m1 is married to w1 and w2 is single. If w3
is married to m3 then our matching is equal to 0 and we are done. Otherwise, m3
and w3 are both single and they marry to arrive at 0:
Notice that the matching 0 contains a proper subset of the matches that are
present in W and matches the farsighted woman with the same partner as in W.
The fact that a non-core element can yield a myopic-farsighted stable set is sur-
prising. It follows from Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) that in case
all players are myopic, the myopic-farsighted stable set coincides with the core. It
follows from Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) that in case all players
are farsighted, the myopic-farsighted stable sets are the singleton sets containing
a core-element. In case not all players have the same degree of farsightedness, an
31
element outside the core may result.
8 Conclusion
Motivated by empirical and experimental evidence that agents have heterogeneous
degrees of farsightedness, we study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for mar-
riage problems in the presence of both myopic and farsighted players. To do so, we in-
troduce the new notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted
improving path is a sequence of matchings that can emerge when farsighted players
form or destroy links based on the improvement the end matching o¤ers relative to
the current matching while myopic players form or destroy matches based on the
improvement the resulting matching o¤ers relative to the current matching.
The myopic-farsighted stable set corresponds to the von Neumann Morgenstern
stable set based on myopic-farsighted improving paths. A myopic-farsighted stable
set is therefore dened as a set of matchings such that there is no myopic-farsighted
improving path from any matching in the set to another matching in the set (internal
stability) and there is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside
the set to some matching in the set (external stability).
The myopic-farsighted stable set bridges the case where all players are myopic
and the case where all players are farsighted. It reduces to the pairwise CP vNM
set of Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) when all players are myopic.
Under these circumstances, the myopic-farsighted stable set is unique and is equal
to the core. In case all players are farsighted, it corresponds to the vNM farsightedly
stable set of Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) under the formulation that
only single players and pairs of players can create and destroy links. The myopic-
farsighted stable sets with only farsighted players are characterized as the singletons
containing a core element.
We then assume all men to be myopic, whereas any woman may be either far-
sighted or myopic. We provide a condition under which the woman-optimal stable
matching is always a myopic-farsighted stable set. Hence, the most farsighted side
of the market is favored in the sense that the presence of some farsighted women is
enough to guarantee that the woman-optimal stable matching can always be reached,
starting from any other matching, by means of a myopic-farsighted improving path.
We use the simplest example of a marriage problem with the preferences of men
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and women diametrically opposed to each other to show that the woman-optimal
stable matching is the unique myopic-farsighted stable set, even when the core is
not a singleton. We thereby provide a theory of equilibrium selectionfor stable
matchings that links the theoretical results regarding the stability of some selected
stable matching with the experimental and empirical evidence that has analyzed
whether markets systematically favor a selected stable matching with particular
characteristics. However, other myopic-farsighted stable sets can exist consisting of
a core element di¤erent from the woman-optimal matching or even of a non-core
element. Thus, farsighted players cannot always guarantee to themselves a better
stable matching than myopic players.
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